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Folk Knowledge Attributions and the Protagonist Projection Hypothesis1 
 
ABSTRACT 
A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that folk knowledge attribution practices 
regarding some epistemological thought experiments differ significantly from the consensus 
found in the philosophical literature. More specifically, laypersons are likely to ascribe 
knowledge in the so-called Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases, while most philosophers deny 
knowledge in these cases. The intuitions shared by philosophers are often used as evidence in 
favor (or against) certain philosophical analyses of the notion of knowledge. However, the fact 
that these intuitions are not universal, as non-philosophers do not sympathize with verdicts made 
by philosophers, is problematic and requires some explanation. Recently, a promising theoretical 
approach emerged that could be used to explain away unexpected folk knowledge attributions. 
According to the protagonist projection hypothesis, when subjects answer questions about some 
hypothetical scenario, their judgments might result from adopting the cognitive perspective of 
the protagonist in the given scenario. Previous experimental findings suggest protagonist 
projection might be responsible for problematic knowledge attributions in Gettier-style cases. 





Evidence Gettier-style scenarios and investigated the impact of protagonist projection on folk 
knowledge ascriptions in such cases. The results bring some support to the protagonist projection 








Many epistemologists believe that counterexamples to the classic theory of knowledge proposed 
by Edmund Gettier (1963) provide an ultimate refutation of that theory. According to the classic 
(or tripartite) account of knowledge, knowledge possession involves three simple constituents: 1) 
belief, 2) truth, and 3) justification. In terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: for 
any proposition p, and any agent A, A knows that p iff A has a true, justified belief that p. 
Contrary to that idea, Gettier cases describe situations in which agents possess certain true and 
justified beliefs—which, according to the classic analysis, should count as knowledge—but 
nevertheless elicit intuitions that the agents in question do not know the relevant propositions. 
Since then Gettier scenarios (and other similar cases introduced later that I will call Gettier-style 
cases, since they also aim at eliciting intuitions inconsistent with the classic theory of 
knowledge) have become the crucial test that any proposed analysis of knowledge needs to pass 
in order to receive recognition. 
 However, recently some researchers (e.g., Starmans & Friedman 2012) argued that it is 
unclear that Gettier (and Gettier-style) cases unequivocally elicit intuitions shared by 
epistemologists. It turned out that many subjects not trained in philosophy tend to attribute 
knowledge in some situations of that sort. While this may not be the case for scenarios modeled 
on the original Gettier cases, where most non-philosophers deny knowledge in accordance with 
philosophers (e.g. Nagel et al. 2013a; Machery et al. 2017a, 2017b), it is a serious issue for other, 
more elaborate Gettier-style cases (similar to the Fake Barns scenario introduced by Goldman, 
1976), where the majority of subjects are happy to attribute knowledge against philosophical 
consensus (e.g. Colaço et al. 2014; Ziółkowski 2016). The agreement between philosophers and 





cases) is believed to be unsurprising, since here the crucial belief is a result of an impaired 
cognitive process (e.g., valid reasoning from false premises), which may violate the justification 
requirement. The latter type, also known as Authentic Evidence cases, does not have that trait. 
 One interesting attempt to tackle these troublesome knowledge attributions rests on the 
reference to a phenomenon known as protagonist projection, which consists in a tendency to 
answer questions from the cognitive perspective of the protagonist in the presented scenario (for 
a detailed definition of this phenomenon, see Holton, 1997). Some tentative data suggest that 
protagonist projection might in fact play an important role here—many subjects who attribute 
knowledge in Gettier cases do so because they adopt the perspective of the protagonist in 
question (Nagel et al. 2013a; Machery et. al 2017a, 2017b). However, most of the data collected 
so far concern Apparent Evidence cases. 
 I will focus on Authentic Evidence cases and aim at establishing whether the strong 
tendency of laypersons to attribute knowledge in such cases stems from subjects’ inclination to 
project into the cognitive perspective of the protagonists in the scenarios. If that turned out true, 
folk judgments concerning these cases could not be treated as genuine knowledge attributions 
and would not be inconsistent with philosophical tradition.  
 In section 2, I briefly sketch previous empirical findings regarding folk knowledge 
attribution practices in Gettier-style cases, with special attention devoted to results that seem to 
be at odds with the consensus found in the philosophical literature. In section 3, I introduce the 
protagonist projection hypothesis and discuss its possible explanatory merits with regards to 
unexpected folk knowledge ascriptions. Then, in section 4, I turn to present the methods 
employed in my experiment and the results it yielded. My findings are rather unfavorable to the 





for some Authentic Evidence cases I investigated the majority of participants tend to attribute 
knowledge even if they are offered an opportunity to withdraw their antecedent attributions and 
indicate protagonist projection. Therefore, in section 5, I conclude that it seems that a substantial 
number of problematic folk knowledge ascriptions cannot be explained away by protagonist 
projection.   
 
2. Troublesome experimental findings 
The original scenarios presented by Gettier (1963) describe situations in which an agent forms a 
belief (say: B) that is true and justified, but it seems wrong to say that B is an instance of 
knowledge. However, the belief in question always results from a deductive reasoning based on a 
false premise. For example: Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford and forms an 
according belief. Then, Smith performs a perfectly valid reasoning based on disjunction 
introduction rule—if p, then p˅q—and forms another belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is 
in Barcelona. This latter belief turns out to be true, but thanks to the fact that Brown is in 
Barcelona—Smith happens to be wrong about Jones (he actually drives a rental), but luckily 
introduced a true disjunct about Brown. Thus, Smith’s true and justified belief that either Jones 
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona resulted from a valid reasoning based on a false premise 
(that Jones owns a Ford). Starmans & Friedman (2012) propose to call this type of Gettier-style 
cases Apparent Evidence cases, since the crucial belief in this kind of scenarios is always based 
on apparent (false) evidence and the process of belief acquisition is cognitively flawed. These 
kinds of scenarios are also referred to as false lemma cases, since they involve an inference from 
a false premise, which makes the reasoning in question obviously incorrect (although it is correct 





subjects not trained in philosophy deny knowledge in such cases, similarly to professional 
philosophers. 
 Empirical evidence suggests that Gettier’s own intuitions about Apparent Evidence cases 
are in fact shared by many laypersons. For example, Machery et al. (2017a) in their cross-
cultural study that investigated two different Apparent Evidence cases, found that folk intuitions 
elicited by these cases are in line with those expressed in philosophical literature for most 
investigated ethnic groups (participants from India were an exception here). For example, for 
their Hospital case, Machery et al. (2017a) found that the majority of respondents from USA 
(70.3%) denied knowledge straight away, when offered a simple “Yes-or-No” knowledge 
question. The results collected from Brazilian and Japanese subjects were similar. A follow-up 
study conducted by Machery et al. (2017b) that investigated users of 17 different languages 
corroborated the initial findings—Gettier intuitions seem to be widespread and quite consistent 
across ethnicities.  
 Unfortunately for philosophers, Apparent Evidence cases are not the only type of Gettier-
style cases important for epistemological debates. There is another class of Gettier-style cases, 
sometimes called Authentic Evidence cases (e.g. Starmans & Friedman, 2012), that describe 
situations where an agent has a true, justified belief that results from solid (true) evidence.2 
Nevertheless, most philosophers would deny knowledge in such cases. One of the most famous 
examples of that sort is the Fake Barns case authored by Carl Ginet and first introduced in the 
literature by Alvin Goldman (1976). One variant of the scenario used in the experiment 






Gerald is driving through the countryside with his young son Andrew. Along the 
way he sees numerous objects and points them out to his son. “That’s a cow, 
Andrew,” Gerald says, “and that over there is a house where farmers live”. Gerald 
has no doubt about what the objects are. What Gerald and Andrew do not realize 
is the area they are driving through was recently hit by a very serious tornado. 
This tornado did not harm any of the animals, but did destroy most buildings. In 
an effort to maintain the rural area’s tourist industry, local townspeople built 
house façades in the place of destroyed houses. These façades look exactly like 
real houses from the road, but are only for looks and cannot be used as actual 
housing. Though he has only recently entered the tornado-ravaged area, Gerald 
has already encountered a large number of house façades. However, when he tells 
Andrew “That’s a house”, the object he sees and points at is a real house that has 
survived the tornado (Colaço et al. 2014, p. 201). 
 
 In this scenario, Gerald has a true and justified belief that he saw a house, but it is true 
only due to luck—he could have easily looked at a house façade and formed a false belief 
instead.3 In the Gettierized condition the researchers asked their respondents “Does Gerald know 
he saw a house?”, while in the control condition the question was “Does Gerald know he saw a 
cow?”. Answers were measured on a six-point Likert scale. Colaço et al. (2014) observed a 
significant difference between the control and Gettierized conditions (according to benchmarks 
proposed by Cohen, 1988, the size of the observed effect, d = 0.39, could be classified as small-
to-medium); however the average knowledge rating in the Gettierized condition was still 





philosophers, most of laypersons were likely to attribute knowledge in the Fake Barns case. 
These findings were later corroborated by Ziółkowski (2016). 
 Another important Gettier-style thought experiment discussed in the literature, which I 
will refer to as the Thermometer case, was put forward by Goldman (1986). It was first adopted 
for the sake of empirical research and experimentally tested by Ziółkowski (2016). The version 
he used is presented below. 
 
Stephen is a high school history teacher. One morning, Josh, his son, enters the 
kitchen. Josh feels ill. He complains about having a cough, runny nose, and a rash 
on his skin. Stephen examines the symptoms of Josh’s disease in detail. He 
discovers that most of his son’s body is covered with small red spots. He also sees 
that Josh has red, bloodshot eyes. Stephen wants to check whether Josh also has a 
fever. Stephen takes a box full of thermometers out of the kitchen cupboard. He 
picks one thermometer from the box and takes Josh’s temperature. The 
thermometer indicates 98.6 degrees, leading Stephen to believe that his son’s 
temperature is normal, which is true. However, unbeknownst to Stephen, the 
thermometer he used is the only reliable thermometer in the box. All other 
thermometers in the box are defective and they would read 98.6 even if Josh had a 
fever. Still, the thermometer that Stephen used was working fine and gave the 
correct reading of the temperature (Ziółkowski, 2016, p. 357).  
       
 Although the comparison between the control condition (“Does Stephen know his son has 





yielded statistically significant results, the size of the difference was not very large (d = 0.49). 
Most laypersons judged that Stephen knows his son’s temperature, regardless of the fact pointed 
out by many philosophers, that here the agent was lucky to pick the only reliable thermometer 
from the box. The presence of epistemic luck did not stop laypersons from attributing knowledge 
in this case. 
 Starmans & Friedman (2012) tested yet another kind of Authentic Evidence cases, where 
the belief in question is true and well-justified, but its truthmaker is being replaced in the 
process. Here is one of their vignettes, which I will call Wristwatch: 
 
Peter is in his locked apartment reading, and is about to have a shower. He puts 
his book down on the coffee table, and takes off his black plastic watch and leaves 
it on the coffee table. Then he goes into the bathroom. As Peter’s shower begins, a 
burglar silently breaks into the apartment. The burglar takes Peter’s black plastic 
watch, replaces it with an identical black plastic watch, and then leaves. Peter is 
still in the shower, and did not hear anything (Starmans & Friedman, 2012, p. 
274). 
 
 The respondents were asked to fill in the blank space in the statement “Peter ... that there 
is a watch on the table” (or “Peter … that there is a book on the table” in the control condition) 
by choosing from two options: “really knows” or “only thinks”. Once again, the majority of 
laypersons did not find a good reason to deny knowledge in the Gettierized condition, where 





Friedman (2012) obtained similar results for another Authentic Evidence case they tested in their 
second experiment (the Bic Pen scenario, which can be found in Appendix A).  
 All the empirical findings discussed above may pose serious problems for 
epistemologists. Of course the relationship between folk knowledge attribution practices and 
philosophical theories of knowledge may not be a straightforward one—in particular, the 
discovery that some philosophical analyses of knowledge are not backed up by folk intuitions 
does not have to mean that these analyses should be discarded. Nevertheless, the fact that, 
contrary to a widespread consensus among professional philosophers, laypersons tend to attribute 
knowledge in Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases, requires some explanation. Starmans & 
Friedman (2012) put forward a bold conclusion that the folk conception of knowledge is simply 
different from the notion of knowledge shared by epistemologists. However, some philosophers 
consider this conclusion unwelcome, as they believe that the notion of knowledge should rather 
be universal. One way to preserve the universality thesis is to provide an error theory of these 
folk epistemic intuitions which are at odds with philosophical tradition. Such a theory, pointing 
at possible biases in laypersons’ judgments or misunderstandings these judgments stem from, 
might be used to explain away troublesome data presented above, thus, making them harmless 
for the universality claim. One theoretical approach following this line of reasoning, the 
protagonist projection hypothesis, is discussed in the next section. 
 
3. The Protagonist Projection Hypothesis 
The protagonist projection hypothesis is a promising theoretical account that might be helpful in 
dealing with the puzzling empirical findings presented above. According to this hypothesis, 





regarding the scenario, the answers provided by the subjects might result from their tendency to 
adopt the cognitive perspective of the protagonist in the scenario. To put it differently, 
respondents may project the cognitive perspective of the protagonist onto their own answers, 
thus, the name protagonist projection hypothesis. It was first presented by Holton (1997) and 
later used in experimental philosophy (among others) by Buckwalter (2014) in his research 
concerning seemingly non-factive uses of factive verbs (such as ‘know’, ‘learn’, or ‘realize’). I 
will now present some of Buckwalter’s findings to illustrate the possible explanatory merits of 
the protagonist projection hypothesis.  
 Factive verbs are usually used in language expressions to refer to dyadic relations 
occurring between agents and propositions—for instance, a sentence ‘A knows that p’ refers to a 
knowledge relation holding between the agent A and the proposition p. Traditionally, it is 
assumed that statements containing such verbs logically entail other factual claims—for 
example, if ‘A knows that p’ is true, then the proposition p has to be true as well (similarly for 
‘realize’ or ‘learn’)—and for that reason we call them factive verbs. However, in ordinary 
language one can easily find examples of statements which seem to violate the factivity 
assumption. Here is one example used in Buckwalter’s (2014) experiments: (A) “Everyone knew 
that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are 
actually caused by bacterial infection”. While (A) sounds like a potentially felicitous claim, it 
also suggests that it is possible to know a proposition p even when p is false, so it appears to be a 
counterexample to the factivity assumption. However, Buckwalter presents an alternative 
interpretation: it might be that when subjects make (or accept) utterances like (A), they attach 
some non-literal meaning to them that stems from projecting into someone else’s cognitive 





ulcers is caused by bacterial infection, people thought they knew stress caused ulcers, but they 
were simply wrong. Buckwalter presented his respondents with sentences like (A), and asked 
them what is meant by ‘knew’ in the sentence, offering them two options: (a) “Everyone thought 
they knew”; (b) “Everyone really did know”.5 It turned out that only 9% indicated (b), while the 
rest chose the projective answer, which suggests that they adopt a non-literal reading of (A).6 
This non-literal meaning is not inconsistent with the factivity of ‘know’. Therefore, thanks to the 
protagonist projection hypothesis, we can show that claims such as (A) are only apparent 
counterexamples to the factivity assumption. 
 A similar argumentative strategy to that presented by Buckwalter (2014) in the discussion 
about the factivity assumption might be formulated in order to explain away problematic 
knowledge attributions, which is the main issue investigated in this paper. After all, it is possible 
that knowledge ascriptions made by laypersons in Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases are 
only apparent and result from protagonist projection. In other words, when subjects judge that 
the protagonist of a given scenario knows that p, they might really mean that the protagonist 
thinks he or she knows p, but in fact does not know it. If that was the case, high ratios of 
knowledge attributions made by laypersons in Authentic Evidence cases (see section 2) would 
not be problematic for epistemology, as they would not be genuine knowledge attributions in the 
first place. This idea was put to the test by Nagel et al. (2013a), who examined a number of both 
Apparent and Authentic Evidence cases. Participants of their study were given two opportunities 
to deny knowledge—first in a straightforward question (“Does the protagonist know whether or 
not p?”; answer options: “yes”, “no”, or “unclear”), and second, offered to those who initially 
provided a positive answer, where subjects could choose from two options: (i) “The protagonist 





know it”. The researchers report that in those cases they investigated, only 41% of subjects deny 
knowledge in their first response, 24% deny it in the second, and only 35% make an 
“unwavering” knowledge attribution.7 They also separately present data obtained for one 
Authentic Evidence case included their study, the American Car case, which was first used in 
experimental philosophy by Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich (2001),8 later also examined in studies 
carried out by Cullen (2010). The scenario runs as follows: 
 
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore 
thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick 
has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a 
Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car (Nagel et al., 2013a, p. 660).   
 
 Only 38% of their participants denied knowledge on the first given occasion, with 
another 21% denying it when asked for the second time, while 41% attributed knowledge in both 
questions.9 The results reported by Nagel et al. (2013a) show that a considerable number of 
laypersons who ascribe knowledge in Gettier-style cases revoke their judgment when given an 
opportunity and indicate that their antecedent attribution was a result of protagonist projection. 
 Machery et al. (2017a) also employed an analogous strategy as had Nagel et al. (2013a) 
in their experiment and observed a similar pattern of results—presenting a second, projective 
question regarding knowledge, resulted in a higher number of knowledge denials. For example, 
in the Hospital case mentioned in the previous section, 86% of Americans denied knowledge in 
the second question, while only 70% did so in the first question. The data for other nationalities 





Interestingly, the level of protagonist projection for Indian subjects was considerably higher than 
for other nationalities, and offering them a projective question showed that their epistemic 
intuitions regarding the investigated Gettier-style cases do not differ in an important way from 
other ethnic groups. 
 The two studies discussed above suggest that the protagonist projection hypothesis might 
be a useful tool when it comes to explaining away unexpected folk knowledge attributions in 
Gettier-style cases. However, Machery et al. (2017a) study and the follow-up by Machery et al. 
(2017b) only focused on Apparent Evidence cases, while Nagel et al. (2013a) do not report 
precise data separately for Authentic and Apparent Evidence cases (with the small exception of 
the American Car scenario). I will now turn to present my experiment, in which I focus on 
knowledge attribution practices regarding five different Authentic Evidence cases. 
 
4. The experiment 
4.1. Research objectives 
The main aim of the study was to estimate the level of protagonist projection in laypersons’ 
reactions to different Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases, or, to put it differently, measure 
how many knowledge attributions made by laypersons in such cases are only apparent, resulting 
from subjects’ tendency to answer questions from the epistemic perspective of the protagonist in 
the presented scenario. How many subjects who initially ascribe knowledge in Authentic 
Evidence Gettier-style cases later withdraw the attribution when confronted with the 








The study materials included five vignettes: American Car, Fake Barns, Thermometer, 
Wristwatch, and Bic Pen. Each is based on a different Authentic Evidence case previously 
discussed in the literature (for the origins of each case—see sections 2 and 3 above). Among 
these vignettes, the American Car case was the only one that has been previously tested for 
protagonist projection (Nagel et al. 2013a) and was included in the experiment with intention of 
corroborating earlier findings. 
 The experiment was carried out as an online survey designed using an open-source 
software called LimeSurvey (www.limesurvey.org) and was posted on servers owned by 
KogniLab, X-Phi lab based at the University of Warsaw (www.kognilab.pl).    
 Each survey started with a demographic section which collected information on subjects’ 
gender, age, and education. It also included two screening questions: one asked whether the 
participant was a native English speaker, the other explored whether the respondent studied 
philosophy in the past. Those subjects who admitted to not being native English speakers or 
reported having a degree in philosophy (BA, MA or PhD) were excluded from further statistical 
analysis.11  
 The experimental design was a between-subjects 2x5 factorial model, with the two 
following factors: Gettierization (control, test/Gettierized), and scenario (American Car, Fake 
Barns, Thermometer, Wristwatch, Bic Pen). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 
the five vignettes and one of the two conditions. The conditions did not differ in the contents of 
the presented scenarios, but only in the questions asked to the participants: in the control 
condition the crucial knowledge question regarded a belief which was, in the considered 





“Gettierized” (a true, justified belief that, according to intuitions shared by many 
epistemologists, does not count as knowledge). 
 After filling in the demographic section, each participant was presented with one vignette 
and answered a series of questions about it. First, they had to pass a short comprehension check 
consisting of two queries about some obvious factual features of the presented vignette. For the 
sake of illustration, in the American Car case they were as follows: C1) “Has Jill got an 
American car?”; answer options: “yes” or “no”; C2) “What kind of car has Jill got?”; answer 
options: “A Buick” or “A Pontiac”. Respondents who failed to provide correct answers to these 
questions were not included in the final statistical analysis. Afterwards, the subjects were asked 
the crucial knowledge question—“Does [protagonist’s name] know that [the target 
proposition]?”—and offered a 7-point answer scale ranging from “Doesn’t know” (numbered 0) 
to “Knows” (numbered 6); only the endpoints were labeled. For the American Car case it was: 
K1-control) “Does Bob know that Jill has driven a Buick for many years?”; (K1-test) “Does Bob 
know that Jill drives an American Car?”. Finally, the protagonist projection question was 
presented on a separate screen (so that the participants had no opportunity to change their 
antecedent judgments under the influence of the protagonist projection question).12 The same 
format was employed for every vignette and condition: (K2) “What best describes the situation 
portrayed in the scenario?”; and the participants could choose from two options: (A) 
“[protagonist’s name] thinks (s)he knows that [the target proposition], but (s)he doesn’t really 









A total of 891 respondents participated in the study. All were recruited via a professional 
respondent panel, ClickWorker (www.clickworker.com), and received a small financial 
compensation for filling in the survey. The exclusion procedure (see section 4.2. for details) 
yielded a final sample size of 805. Of those 805 subjects, 166 were assigned to the American Car 
vignette, 171 assessed the Fake Barns case, 161 the Thermometer case, 153 the Wristwatch case, 
and 154 evaluated the Bic Pen scenario.14 62% of the participants were female. The age 
distribution ranged from 18 to 93 (M = 35.02; SD = 11.47), and was slightly skewed (50% of the 
respondents were 33 years old or younger).15 When it comes to education, the sample was quite 
diverse: 36% of subjects had a Bachelor’s degree, 11% a Master’s degree, 2% a PhD, 32% 
underwent some college education but did not receive a degree (or have not received one yet), 
and 16% did not attend college at all (the remaining 3% indicated the option ‘other’). 
 
4.4. Results    
In the presentation of the data I will first focus on participants’ answers to the initial knowledge 
question (K1) depending on Gettierization (control vs. test condition) and scenario. In order to 
analyze the data concerning K1, I employed a 2x5 between-subjects ANOVA analysis. 
 A significant main effect of Gettierization was observed—the participants were, on 
average, less likely to attribute knowledge in the test condition (M = 4.83, SD = 2.04) than in the 
control condition (M = 5.71, SD = 0.95); F(1,795) = 64.79; p < 0.001; ղ2 = 0.075. The analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of scenario as well: F(4,795) = 15.98; p < 0.001; ղ2 = 0.074. 
Further post-hoc comparisons between scenarios (Bonferroni method, p < 0.05) show that this 





in the Fake Barns case (M = 5.05, SD = 1.82) than in the Wristwatch, and Bic Pen cases. Also, 
their tendency to ascribe knowledge was significantly lower in the American Car case (M = 4.58, 
SD = 2.13) compared to all other four scenarios. There were no differences between the 
Thermometer case (M = 5.43, SD = 1.46), the Wristwatch case (M = 5.71, SD = 1.06), and the 
Bic Pen case (M = 5.66, SD = 1.15). Moreover, a significant interaction effect between the two 
factors emerged: F(4,795) = 5.6; p < 0.001; ղ2 = 0.027. Pairwise comparisons between the 
control and test condition performed independently for each scenario (Bonferroni method, p < 
0.05) revealed that this interaction appeared because Gettierization had the predicted impact on 
knowledge attributions only in the American Car, Fake Barns, and Thermometer cases, but not 
in the Wristwatch and Bic Pen cases. The average knowledge ratings for each scenario 
depending on Gettierization are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 The data corroborates previous experimental findings. As in studies by Colaço et al. 
(2014) and Ziółkowski (2016), I found a significant effect of Gettierization in the Fake Barns 
case (d = 0.75, which could be classified as mid-to-large effect). Moreover, a similar effect, but 
smaller in size (d = 0.57), was observed for the Thermometer case, which supports data presented 
by Ziółkowski (2016). The size of the Gettierization effect was the most prominent in the case of 
the American Car scenario (d = 0.79), which is in line with data collected by Cullen (2010) and 
Nagel et al. (2013a)—although they used a different, “yes-or-no” answer scale and did not 
include a control condition in their experiments, they observed that many laypersons tend to 
deny knowledge in the Gettierized condition when confronted with the American Car scenario. 
And lastly, high knowledge ratings for the Wristwatch and Bic Pen cases fit the same pattern as 
the findings reported by Starmans & Friedman (2012). It is worth noting that all three 





clearly above the midpoint of the scale in both the control and test condition for each 
investigated scenario, which means that laypersons were rather attributing knowledge than 
denying it across all experimental conditions (for measure K1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Average answers to the first knowledge question (K1) in each experimental condition. 
0 = ‘doesn’t know’; 6 = ‘knows’. An asterisk indicates a significant difference between ratings in 
the control and test condition (Bonferroni post-hoc, p < 0.05), no asterisk means lack of 
statistical significance. 
 
 I now turn to present the data collected in the projective knowledge question (K2), where 
the participants had a chance to withdraw their initial knowledge attributions and admit 





participants who attributed knowledge in K1 (judgments above the midpoint of the scale) and K2 
in each scenario and experimental condition. 
 
 
Figure 2. The proportion of laypersons attributing knowledge in K1 (Likert scale rating above 
the midpoint) and K2 (two-point projective question). 
 
 Across all five examined Authentic Evidence cases, the majority of respondents initially 
ascribed knowledge in the Gettierized condition, i.e., provided a positive answer to the first 
knowledge question (K1), although for the American Car and Fake Barns scenarios the number 
of attributions was considerably lower. Importantly, in the Thermometer, Wristwatch, and Bic 
Pen cases, the majority of participants still attributed knowledge, even when asked about it for 
the second time in the projective question (K2). In the Fake Barns case subjects’ answers to K2 





experiment, as it was the only vignette that encouraged most of the participants (75%) to deny 
knowledge in K2. 
In order to investigate which factors affected subjects’ judgments in K2, I performed a 
logistic regression analysis16. The first model included Gettierization and scenario as factors. The 
model was statistically significant (χ2(5) = 150.2; p < 0.001) and explained 23.8% of variance 
(Nagelkerke R2) with 74% level of accuracy. Unsurprisingly, a significant and considerably 
strong main effect of Gettierization emerged—subjects were less likely to attribute knowledge in 
K2 in the Gettierized condition than in the control condition (p < 0.001). Scenario also played a 
significant role here—the baseline for comparisons was the American Car condition, where the 
number of knowledge denials was the most prominent. It turned out that, comparing to this case, 
participants were considerably more likely to attribute knowledge in K2 for the Bic Pen, 
Wristwatch, and Thermometer scenarios (p < 0.001; with similar B coefficients) and slightly 
more likely to do it in the Fake Barns case (p < 0.01). Detailed results of the analysis can be 
found in Tables 1. and 2. in Appendix B. I also tested another Logit model which included 
interactions between Gettierization and scenario to see whether the impact of Gettierization on 
K2 judgments was different between scenarios. None of the interactions turned out to be 
significant, and overall the model without interactions fit the data better than the model including 
interactions (see Appendix B). Thus, although some scenarios elicited more knowledge denials 
in K2 than others, we have no reason to say that Gettierization affected K2 judgments differently 






Figure 3. The percentage of subjects who first attributed knowledge in K1 and later withdrew or 
supported their attribution in K2. 
 
Figure 3. presents the relation between positive ratings (knowledge attributions) in K1 
and final judgments in K2. Across all the scenarios and conditions, 711 of 805 subjects (88.3%) 
attributed knowledge in K1; the figure shows how many of those subjects later withdrew or 
supported their attribution when confronted with the projective question (K2). If we observed 
that the majority (or at least a noticeable portion) of participants revoke their initial attributions 
when offered a projective question, then we could conclude the data strongly support the 
protagonist projection hypothesis. But that’s not what we obtained for the Thermometer, 
Wristwatch, and Bic Pen cases, where the majority of participants supported their initial 
attribution17—in the Gettierized condition less than one third of the respondents who first 





main reason why laypersons ascribe knowledge in these cases. Compared to the three 
abovementioned cases, the number of subjects withdrawing their initial attribution in the test 
condition for the Fake Barns case was somewhat higher (38%). Interestingly, here a substantial 
number of subjects (27%) also changed their mind in the control condition, which was supposed 
to be a clear case of knowledge. Once again, the American Car scenario stood out from the rest, 
since here most of the respondents (64%) who first ascribed knowledge in the test condition later 
denied it18. However, similarly as in the case of Fake Barns scenario, many subjects (28%) 
decided to resign from their antecedent knowledge attribution in the control condition, which 
was not expected. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The results obtained in the experiment discussed above are twofold—they confirm our 
expectations based on previous empirical findings as far as folk knowledge attribution practices 
in Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases are concerned, but, at the same time, they do not fully 
support our hopes regarding the role of protagonist projection in the mechanics of these 
attributions. 
 I will present two alternative interpretations of the data. What needs to be noted, though, 
is that these interpretations are mutually exclusive, which I am aware of. The first evaluates the 
protagonist projection predictions based on the data and assumes that our measure of protagonist 
projections is accurate. The second interpretation is slightly more speculative and addresses 
some doubts regarding this latter assumption—maybe the traditional methods do not allow us to 







5. 1. Taking data at face value 
If the protagonist projection hypothesis played the expected role in explaining away problematic 
folk knowledge attributions in Authentic Evidence cases, we should have observed that a large 
portion (preferably: majority) of subjects who initially attribute knowledge (K1) later withdraw 
their attributions when presented with the projective question (K2). But that did not happen for 
the Thermometer, Wristwatch, and Bic Pen cases. The data does not support the prediction that 
the inclination of laypersons to attribute knowledge in these scenarios is due to protagonist 
projection. On the other hand, the protagonist projection hypothesis did bear out for the 
American Car and—to some degree—Fake Barns cases. 
If we aggregate the data from all five scenarios, it turns out that in the Gettierized 
condition, out of those subjects who initially ascribed knowledge (n = 325) only 35% later 
denied it when offered an opportunity to choose the projective answer. It means that the majority 
of laypersons (65%) who attribute knowledge in Authentic Evidence cases included in the 
experiment uphold their attributions and deny that they intended to project the perspective of the 
protagonist onto their answers. The American Car case remains the only one in which the 
majority of participants decided to resign from their initial positive knowledge judgments. Here, 
75% of laypersons denied knowledge when presented with the projective question (K2) 
compared to 64% of initial knowledge ascriptions (K1). In Fake Barns answers to the projective 
question (K2) in the Gettierized condition split almost in half (compared to 72% of initial 
attributions), which might suggest some projection at play, but still leaves us with a substantial 






 The results might seem odd at first sight, but we should take into account that, at least 
when initial knowledge attributions are concerned, they are in line with previous findings I 
briefly discussed in Sections 2 and 3. However, noticeable differences between scenarios shown 
by the data require some explanation. Interestingly, the pattern here is similar for both 
knowledge measures (K1 and K2)—on average subjects were less likely to attribute knowledge 
in the American Car and Fake Barns cases than in the other scenarios investigated in the 
experiment (this difference was slightly more pronounced for K2 than K1).   
 Blouw, Buckwalter, & Turri (2017) offered an interesting explanatory framework that 
could be helpful here—they present a taxonomy of Gettier-style cases which tracks differences 
between scenarios along three dimensions: Detection, Threat, and Replacement.19 Detection 
concerns whether or not an agent initially succeeds or fails in detecting the truth value of the 
believed proposition and it is useful in drawing a distinction between Apparent Evidence and 
Authentic Evidence cases—while agents fail to detect certain falsehoods in the former type, there 
is no such failure in the latter type. Threat tracks the presence of epistemic misfortune and 
luck—one can form a true belief that might be disrupted by misfortune, but is not (threat is 
unsuccessful) or a true belief whose truth-making relation ends up being disrupted by a stroke of 
bad luck (threat is successful). Replacement concerns those cases where Threat is successful, but 
thanks to another stroke of luck the truthmaker of the belief in question is being replaced in the 
process—the replacement might be very similar to the original truthmaker, or quite dissimilar. 
While all five vignettes investigated in my experiment seem to be alike as far as Detection is 
concerned, there are some significant differences along the Threat and Replacement dimensions. 
While Threat is unsuccessful in the Fake Barns and Thermometer cases, it is successful in the 





(the truth-making relation is not broken), but it does for the other three. In the Wristwatch and 
Bic Pen cases the replaced truthmaker is very similar to the original (qualitatively identical watch 
or pen), but in the American Car scenario it is quite dissimilar (a Pontiac is a different kind of 
American car than a Buick). According to the model offered by Blouw et al., we should expect 
the following ordering of cases based on the proportion of knowledge attributions: Failed Threat 
> Successful Threat + Similar Replacement > Successful Threat + Dissimilar Replacement. 
This framework might explain why the American Car scenario (Dissimilar Replacement) 
elicited the smallest number of knowledge ascriptions, and, in particular, smaller from ratings for 
the Wristwatch and Bic Pen cases (Similar Replacement). Relatively high knowledge ratings for 
the Thermometer case (Failed Threat) also fit this model. However, a substantial number of 
subjects denied knowledge in the Fake Barns scenario (also a Failed Threat case), which is the 
opposite of what the model predicts. The fact that the Thermometer case seems to be on a par 
with the Wristwatch and Bic Pen cases is another thing that lowers the explanatory values of the 
framework offered by Blouw, Buckwalter, & Turri (2017). Thus, some differences between the 
intuitions evoked by the scenarios investigated in my experiment remain unclear. Since 
exploring those differences was not the main aim of this study, I will just express my hope that 
future research will shed more light on these aspects of my findings. 
    
5. 2. Methodological reservations: do we have a good measure of protagonist projection? 
Unfortunately, besides some results seemingly favorable to the protagonist projection hypothesis, 
the projective knowledge question (K2) yielded some puzzling data as well. What is extremely 
surprising, in those cases where a significant number of subjects found the projective answer 





also tended to withdraw their preceding knowledge attribution in the control condition (28% and 
27% respectively), where no such tendency was predicted. These ratios are comparable to the 
ratios of knowledge attribution withdrawals for the Thermometer, Wristwatch, and Bic Pen 
cases, but in the Gettierized condition. It is difficult to find a good reason for denying knowledge 
in the control condition (regardless of which scenario we consider), since in this situation the 
respondents were asked about beliefs which are non-controversial instances of knowledge.20 One 
might hypothesize that laypersons are simply being “pushed around” here—if the researcher 
insistently keeps asking about knowledge and offers another opportunity to deny it, the 
respondents take it to be an explicit suggestion which they choose to follow. That would mean 
that not all knowledge withdrawals in K2 in fact indicate protagonist projection, but maybe some 
other pragmatic mechanism (one might refer to the Gricean framework here). However, this 
explanation cannot account for the fact that almost no participants withdrew their antecedent 
knowledge ascriptions in the control condition when they were confronted with the 
Thermometer, Wristwatch, and Bic Pen scenarios. Thus, the result in question remains baffling 
and might actually hint that the paraphrasing question (K2) I adopted from the studies by Nagel 
et al. (2013a) and Machery et al. (2017a, 2017b) is not a fully accurate measure of protagonist 
projection. 
 Similar worries were recently addressed by Gonnerman et al. (2020) who investigated 
whether protagonist projection might be responsible for the inclination of laypersons to classify 
some unjustified beliefs as knowledge. While their data show some support for the protagonist 
projection hypothesis in this respect, at the same time they suggest that not all seemingly 
projective answers provided by subjects stem from protagonist projection—at least some of them 





 Although the paraphrasing question constructed along the lines of my K2 prompt has a 
long tradition of usage in X-Phi research, its validity has never been evaluated. In the light of 
results such as those obtained by Gonnerman et. al (2020) or in my study, developing an 
alternative measure of protagonist projection (even for the purpose of cross-validation) might be 







Appendix A: survey questions 
 
Fake Barns—survey questions: 
C1 (control/test): “Does Gerald think he saw a [cow / house]?” (answer options: “yes” or “no”). 
C2 (control/test): “Did Gerald see a [cow / house]?” (answer options: “yes” or “no”). 
K1 (control/test): “Does Gerald know he saw a [cow / house]?” 
K2 answer options (control/test): “Gerald thinks he knows that he saw a [cow / house], but he 
doesn't know that” or “Gerald really knows that he saw a [cow / house]”. 
 
Thermometer—survey questions: 
C1 (control/test): “Does Stephen think his [son has red eyes / son’s temperature is 98.6]?” 
(answer options: “yes” or “no”). 
C2 (control/test): “[Does his son have red eyes / Is his son’s temperature 98.6]?” (answer 
options: “yes” or “no”). 
K1 (control/test): “Does Stephen know his [son has red eyes / son’s temperature is 98.6]?” 
K2 answer options (control/test): “Stephen thinks he knows that his [son has red eyes / son’s 
temperature is 98.6], but he doesn't know that” or “Stephen really knows that his [son has red 
eyes / son’s temperature is 98.6]”. 
 
Wristwatch—survey questions 
C1 (control/test): “Is there a [book / watch] on the table?” (answer options: “yes” or “no”). 
C2 (control/test): “How did the [book / watch] get on the table?” (answer options: “The burglar 





K1 (control/test): “Does Peter know that there is a [book / watch] on the table?” 
K2 answer options (control/test): “Peter thinks he knows that there is a [book / watch] on the 
table, but he doesn't know that” or “Peter really knows that there is a [book / watch] on the 
table”. 
 
Bic Pen—the vignette and survey questions: 
Katie is in her locked apartment writing a letter. She puts the letter and her blue Bic pen down on 
her coffee table. Then she goes into the bathroom to take a shower. As Katie’s shower begins, 
two burglars silently break into the apartment. One burglar takes Katie’s blue Bic pen from the 
table. But the other burglar absentmindedly leaves his own identical blue Bic pen on the coffee 
table. Then the burglars leave. Katie is still in the shower, and did not hear anything (Starmans & 
Friedman, 2012, p. 276). 
 
C1 (control/test): “Is there a [letter / blue Bic pen] on the table?” (answer options: “yes” or 
“no”).  
C2 (control/test): “How did the [letter / blue Bic pen] get on the table?” (answer options: “The 
burglar put it there” or “Katie put it there”). 
K1 (control/test): “Does Katie know that there is a [letter / blue Bic pen] on the table?” 
K2 answer options (control/test): “Katie thinks she knows that there is a [letter / blue Bic pen] 
on the table, but she doesn't know that” or “Katie really knows that there is a [letter / blue Bic 






Appendix B: results of logistic regression for K2 judgments 
 
Table 1. Logit model for K2 responses without interactions 
Predictor B SE B OR OR 95% CI p-value 
Condition 
Control — — — — — 
Gettierized -1.47 0.18 0.23 [0.16; 0.32] <0.001 
Scenario 
American Car — — — — — 
Bic Pen 1.67 0.27 5.34 [3.19; 9.11] <0.001 
Fake Barns 0.66 0.24 1.94 [1.22; 3.09] 0.005 
Thermometer 1.83 0.27 6.24 [3.71; 10.8] <0.001 
Wristwatch 1.65 0.27 5.20 [3.11; 8.84] <0.001 














Table 2. Logit model for K2 responses including interactions 
Predictor B SE B OR OR 95% CI p-value 
Condition 
Control — — — — — 
Gettierized -1.70 0.34 0.18 [0.09; 0.35] <0.001 
Scenario 
American Car — — — — — 
Bic Pen 1.53 0.44 4.63 [2.04; 11.6] <0.001 
Fake Barns 0.39 0.34 1.47 [0.76; 2.86] 0.25 
Thermometer 2.14 0.52 8.49 [3.34; 26.2] <0.001 
Wristwatch 1.36 0.42 3.88 [1.75; 9.34] 0.001 
Condition × Scenario      
American Car – Gettierization — — — — — 
Bic Pen – Gettierization 0.28 0.56 1.33 [0.43; 3.92] 0.62 
Fake Barns – Gettierization 0.53 0.47 1.70 [0.67; 4.32] 0.26 
Thermometer – Gettierization -0.32 0.62 0.72 [0.20; 2.35] 0.60 
Wristwatch – Gettierization 0.50 0.55 1.64 [0.55; 4.77] 0.37 
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2 Nagel et al.(2013b) argue that the distinction between Apparent and Authentic Evidence cases 
is far from being well-defined and clear-cut and that there are several possible understandings of 
it. For the sake of this paper, I propose to employ the understanding fleshed out at the beginning 
of this section. In Apparent Evidence cases the belief which aspires to be knowledge follows 
from another belief which was false at the moment of its formation (e.g., Smith believes that 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona because Smith has a false belief that Jones owns a 
Ford). This research project was financed by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education (DSM 2017 115300-32). 
3 For a detailed discussion concerning the role of luck for knowledge attributions and distinctions 
between different kinds of epistemic luck, see for example Unger (1968) and Pritchard (2005). 
4 This small difference did not pass the threshold of statistical significance, although the 






combined knowledge attributions with partcipants’ confidence ratings. I am grateful to an 
anonymous Referee for pointing this out. 
5 The study also included other purported counterexamples to the factivity assumption containing 
other verbs taken to be factive. 
6 The results were considerably less favorable to the protagonist projection hypothesis for ‘learn’ 
and ‘realize’—in these cases about half of subjects gave non-projective answers (which are 
inconsistent with the factivity assumption). 
7 Nagel et al. (2013a) included few different Apparent and Authentic Evidence Gettier-style 
cases in their study, but they report aggregated results computed together for all the vignettes. 
They also remark that subjects were 2.28 times more likely to immediately ascribe knowledge in 
the Authentic Evidence cases than in the Apparent Evidence cases (reactions to the first 
knowledge question), but do not report any data on possible differences between reactions to the 
second knowledge question depending on the type of case.  
8 Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich (2001) reported data that famously suggested the existence of 
cross-cultural differences in folk intuitions regarding the American Car case and some other 
important epistemological thought experiments. However, recent attempts to replicate their 
controversial discoveries were unsuccessful (see Seyedsayamdost, 2015; Kim & Yuan, 2015). I 
will not discuss Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich’s (2001) findings here, since their data is dubious.  
9 In his earlier study, Cullen (2010) also presented his respondents with the American Car case 
and asked them only one question: “Does Bob know that Jill drives an American Car?”; answer 
options: “knows”, “does not know”. He found that 58% of his participants denied knowledge 






projective question was included in his experiment, the observed number of problematic 
knowledge ascriptions would be even smaller than found by Nagel et al. (2013a).  
10 It is important to note that these statistics concern only answers provided by participants who 
judged that the belief in question was justified. Machery et al. (2017a) employed this procedure 
to exclude subjects who did not view the case as a genuine Gettier-style case (i.e. found the 
belief in question not justified).  I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for pointing out that 
issue. 
11 I believe that subjects who received a degree in philosophy most likely had contact with some 
(if not all) scenarios used in the experiment. Since we are interested in untutored and untrained 
intuitions, I think that their answers should not be taken into consideration. 
12 The vignette itself remained at the top of the screen, giving subjects the opportunity to consult 
the contents of the scenario when they were answering the second knowledge question. 
13 The exact formulation of questions for the Fake Barns, Thermometer, Wristwatch, and Bic Pen 
cases can be found in Appendix A. 
14 These small differences in the size of groups were a result of the employed screening 
procedure, which excluded slightly different numbers of participants depending on the vignette 
and experimental condition.  
15 Two respondents did not provide valid information about their age. 
16 I am grateful to the Editors of Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol. 4, for 
suggesting this approach. 
17 Chi-square tests aimed at establishing whether the proportion of supported knowledge 
attributions exceeded 0.5—Thermometer: χ2(1) = 15.5; p < 0.001; Wristwatch: χ2(1) = 12.8; p < 






18 χ2(1) = 4.25; p = 0.039. 
19 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for helpful comments which lead to substantial 
improvements in this passage. 
20 Since the Fake Barns case strongly involves perception in the process of belief acquisition (in 
both the control and test condition), and perception is widely believed to be a fallible cognitive 
mechanism, we might expect laypersons to be uncertain about their knowledge attributions 
regarding this scenario. After all, Gerald looks at objects he describes (cows, houses) from a 
distance and on the move—clearly, sight might be faulty in such circumstances. Asking the 
second knowledge question (K2) might have made this possibility of error more salient to the 
participants and lead them to withdraw their antecedent knowledge ascriptions even in the 
control condition. Unfortunately an analogous line of reasoning cannot be used to explained 
away unpredicted knowledge attribution withdrawals observed for the American Car case, where 
perception does not play a similar role in belief acquisition.  I am grateful to Mieszko 
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